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Transnational deliberative democracy in the context of the European Union:  
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Óscar García Agustín Associate Professor, Department of Culture and Global Studies, 
University of Aalborg 
Abstract: Deliberative democracy is increasingly discussed in relation to the transnational 
sphere in terms of promoting democratic mechanisms of representation and participation. The 
establishment of the European Integration Forum (EIF) represents an effort to apply 
deliberation to the field of integration policies at the EU level. The EIF combines an original 
structure consisting of civil society actors and EU institutions, on the one hand, and national 
and European organisations, on the other. In this article, the institutional and discursive 
dimensions of the EIF are discussed. The institutional dimension refers to the benefits of the 
deliberative model for inclusive policy making and it is argued that it is particularly useful for 
incorporating immigrant voices in consultative processes. The discursive dimension relates to 
the articulation of a common European discourse on integration within the already existing 
EU framework. Discourses of contestation emanating from civil society are constrained 
especially in relation to the identification of a sole target group of integration policies, namely 
third-country nationals. The deliberative approach of the EIF is efficient in its 
institutionalisation through the inclusion of multiple civil society actors, but its discursive 
potential in terms of reflecting a heterogeneity of viewpoints and the capacity for generating 
contestation are reduced. 
Keywords: Deliberative democracy; diversity; institutionalization; discourse; minorities; 
immigration policy; civil society; European Public Sphere; accountability; European 
Commission. 
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Introduction 
Deliberative democracy theory has been moving gradually from the nation-state level to the 
transnational sphere due to increasing degrees of international interdependency and multilevel 
governance structures requiring global solutions (Castells 2008; Held 2009). The 
transnational space has become attractive in terms of new applications of deliberative 
democracy models because of civil society participation beyond national institutions, the 
importance of public opinion for decision making, and questioning of the role of the state in 
times of globalisation. The European Union (EU) is one of the main transnational 
organisations in which deliberative democracy could ‘contribute to rational problem-solving 
and to increase the public reasoning in a justification process’ (Eriksen 2005: 356). The EU 
represents an experimental arena in which deliberative supranationalism (Eriksen and Neyer 
2003) can take place in both methodologies and institutions. 
Herein I discuss the possibilities and limits of transnational deliberation. In particular, I 
analyse the potential of deliberative democracy in relation to the integration of immigrants in 
the EU. The transnational dimension is provided by the EU, whereas the deliberative 
perspective comes from my focus on a new EU institution, namely the European Integration 
Forum (EIF). The EIF was launched in 2009 and comprises representatives from EU 
institutions, on the one hand, and national and international civil society organisations, on the 
other. The main objective is to enhance the participation of civil society organisations (with 
immigrant members) in integration policies as well as strengthen the cooperation between 
actors in the field. I argue that the EIF is an innovative structure that combines the emerging 
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transnational sphere, the incorporation of social networks, and deliberative policy making 
through the inclusion of national and European civil society actors and EU institutions. 
Among the possibilities arising from the EIF are the inclusion of immigrant organisations, the 
preference for national forums to discuss integration, and the increasing participation of civil 
society. They all stress the importance of working with integration in deliberative forums. In 
terms of limitations, I argue that discourses of contestation emanating from civil society are 
constrained by their acceptance of the framework designed by the EU, especially in relation to 
the restriction of EU integration policies to third country nationals, and by the shared interest 
of articulating a common discourse in cooperation with the European Commission (EC). In 
sum, I show how integration policies can become more democratic and deliberative by 
extending collective decision making to civil society actors, including immigrants’ 
organisations. 
To analyse the EIF in detail, I examine its institutionalisation (García Agustín 2010), 
which constitutes a dual and dynamic process that involves institutions and discourses or, in 
Dryzek’s words (1997; 2000), the institutional hardware and software. Drawing on the model 
of deliberative democracy, I consider two theories to be relevant to this institutionalisation: 
The first, Bohman’s republican cosmopolitanism, presents a cosmopolitan perspective, and 
the second, Dryzek’s discursive democracy, underlines the civil society dimension. Both of 
them are distanced from the liberal conceptions of deliberative democracy, and they can shed 
light on the potential of deliberative democracy in the European space. Whereas Bohman 
proposes an institutional design based on the heterogeneity of the new political subject acting 
across borders, Dryzek focuses on the potential of the transnational civil society to change 
policies and the ways of governance. I apply these complementary theoretical contributions to 
the workings of existing institutions, and, in doing so, I follow the recent tendency to move 
deliberative democracy from theoretical statements into working theory (Chambers 2003). In 
this process, deliberative democracy is still normative, but it must be contextualised and 
evaluated in concrete situations. Thus it is necessary to present an analytical framework that 
reflects the normative principles which characterise deliberative democracy.The remainder of 
the article consists of two parts, followed by overall conclusions. The first part defines 
deliberative democracy as an analytical framework and the normative principles it entails. In 
the second part I analyse the EIF in detail by considering the context that influences its work 
(i.e., legal framework, policies, and funding. I then characterise the EIF as a deliberative 
forum and discuss its relevance in the governance of the EU. Finally, I analyse how the EIF is 
developed (combining formal and informal organisations at the national and European levels) 
and how a common European discourse is constituted and, possibly, contested. 
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1. Deliberative democracy 
1.1.  Beyond representation 
Deliberative democracy emerges as an alternative to liberal democracy by addressing its main 
limitations, which include viewing participation only in terms of voting (i.e., an aggregative 
conception of democracy) and the increasing risk of government being in the hands of experts 
(i.e., an elite conception of government) (Luchmann 2002; Parkins and Mitchell 2005; Baños 
2006). Although deliberative democracy can be seen as a rejection of representative 
democracy and its institutions, it can also be viewed as an expansion of representative 
discussions and the institution of a more inclusive process (Chambers 2003; Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004). In contrast to bargaining, which satisfies mostly the private interests of 
political parties and lobby groups, deliberation emphasizes the need for public discussion and 
exchange of information in search of the common good (Pettit 2004). It also entails an 
important correction to interest-group politics (Laborde and Maynor 2008). However, the 
main focus includes both public discussion and public reasoning (Cohen 1996): Citizens’ 
interests and preferences are not predetermined but open to modification in the course of 
public reasoning and argumentative exchange. 
The deliberative ideal must be extended to citizens via institutional design (Sunstein 
2004). In other words, collective decision making must institutionalise both the democratic 
will constituted in institutional spaces and the informal opinion generated in non-institutional 
spaces (Sermeño 2006). It is not surprising that the notion of deliberation has been closely 
related to governance in recent years. Both processes expand democracy by increasing 
participation, although from the perspective of policy analysis a strict version of the reasoning 
principle is not always followed and the focus is instead placed on the emergence of 
deliberative judgement through collective, interactive discourse (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). 
The shifts from government to governance, from representation to deliberation, and from 
institutions to networks reflect the new societal and political reality. I use theories on 
deliberative democracy to develop an analytical framework based on two dimensions, the 
institutional and the discursive, and operationalised through three distinct principles: plurality, 
inclusion and contestation. Plurality is found across the institutional and discursive 
dimensions, whereas I identify inclusion as the main feature of institutionalisation and 
contestation as that of discourse. 
1.2. Institutionalization of heterogeneity 
Bohman (2010) explains the substantial changes taking place in light of globalisation, and he 
identifies the new order as transnational democracy. The latter is characterised by a shift from 
demos (i.e., the unified will of people attached to the nation-state and the juridical model of 
self-legislation) to demoi (a heterogeneous subject, referred to as the community of humanity 
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and guided by the principle of non-domination in a decentred and overlapping model). This 
approach is cosmopolitan in its concern for humanity and in its focus on global justice. 
However, it differs from cosmopolitanism in the importance attributed to the plurality of 
institutions of communities. Bohman’s model also is mainly republican because its main goal 
is to create institutions that promote non-domination at the multilateral level, diminishing the 
threats of national forces and the arising of new global powers. Thus, republican 
cosmopolitanism emphasizes that ‘freedom from domination cannot be achieved without 
transforming our fundamental democratic conceptions and ultimately embedding our 
democratic institutions within a transnational polity’ (Bohman 2010: 18). 
The replacement of self-legislation with non-domination strengthens deliberation as a 
prerequisite for having free citizens. Individuals can only be free and equal if they can 
influence and change the terms of the common life and the institutional framework, including 
the normative powers by which people can control their rights and obligations. Democracy is 
consequently a reflexive order made through citizen deliberation. Bohman (2010) considers 
the power to initiate effective public deliberation as the most fundamental condition for 
democratisation. The transnational sphere allows for spaces for deliberation across borders to 
emerge and it increases the possibilities of shaping institutions. 
Bohman uses the EU as an example of an emerging transnational organisation that deals 
with demoi and not with demos, as nation-states do. Unlike other analyses of democratic 
deficit in the EU, Bohman identifies the deliberative deficit as a deeper problem because the 
reflexive capacity of citizens to initiate democratic reform is at stake. To solve this deficit, the 
EU should provide various sites of deliberation: These should not be based only on territory, 
they should be distinguishable from the nation-state and interaction should happen at multiple 
levels with room for citizens’ concerns (Bohman 2008). Bohman is optimistic about how the 
EU institutional design is being developed and about its future potential, especially because of 
the Open Method of Coordination and the ability to promote accountability at different levels 
(Bohman 2004a). The proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 
transnational sphere confirms a new kind of accountability that supplements the traditional 
one between citizens and representatives; this accountability is derived from the intention of 
NGOs to make forms of inquiry more transparent and more accessible. Thus, transnational 
civil society can actively be part of the decision-making processes in the institutional design 
of the EU (Bohman 2004b). 
1.3. Discourses of contestation 
Like Bohman, Dryzek focuses on the transnational sphere and some of the issues emerging as 
nation-state governments are challenged by globalisation. However, Dryzek underlines the 
prevalence of civil society and disagrees with the constitutional solution proposed by Bohman 
to guarantee the democratic minimum and multilevel governance. Dryzek’s discursive 
democracy is characterised by a critical position against power and by the importance of 
contestation of discourses to influence or change the national or international order. In 
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Dryzek’s model, discourse has a constructive dimension and is defined as ‘a shared set of 
concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with a framework for making sense 
of situations, embodying judgements, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions, and intentions’ 
(Dryzek 2006: 1). Globalisation has accentuated the importance of discourses in international 
relations; they become essential to discussions and reflexivity in the construction of public 
opinion. In other words, acting in the contemporary world requires recognising existing 
discourses and their consequences, including those of policy makers. 
Metaphorically, Dryzek (1997, 2000) views formal rules as institutional hardware and 
discourses as institutional software. Transnational discourses are already well developed, but 
equivalent international institutions are missing (i.e., the software is more important than the 
hardware and can influence more strongly the design of institutions). Thus, it is easier to think 
about democracy beyond borders in terms of deliberation and communication instead of 
voting or representation of individual interests. In this new system, the role of networks and 
governance prevails, and the force of transnational civil society discourses can influence 
decision making and state policies. 
 Deliberative democracy belongs to the transnational sphere to a greater degree than the 
aggregative liberal model (Dryzek 2000). Dryzek (2006) finds deliberative global politics in 
two arenas. The first are formal negotiations taking place in institutions such as the EU or the 
United Nations. It is deliberative in the sense that people can change their minds without non-
coercive communication, but it would be democratic only if access to participation was given 
to all those who are affected by a certain decision. The second consists of diffuse 
communication in the public sphere, which can generate political influence. The main actors 
in this kind of communication are international networks such as NGOs or activists. Dryzek 
pleads for developing transnational social networks and increasing their presence in the 
international system. Transnational civil society possesses communicative power and its 
politics are about questioning, criticizing, and publicizing (Dryzek 1999). Dryzek is more 
explicit than Bohman about the EU’s democratic deficit; he argues that the solution would 
ultimately involve finding channels through which civil society can have political influence. 
At the transnational level, the importance of informal sources of order, such as discourse, 
increases because the formalized institutions are weak and not well defined (Dryzek 2008). 
In summary, both Bohman and Dryzek agree about the importance of the transnational 
sphere for developing new politics beyond or across borders. However, they differ in their 
focus on the creation of institutions that would enhance deliberation (Bohman) and the 
initiative of civil society as the genuine actor capable of facing the transnational challenge 
(Dryzek). In the next section, I will apply these theoretical perspectives in an analytical form. 
I preserve the distinction between institutional and discursive as the dimensions of 
deliberation and relate them to three normative principles: plurality of actors as the reflection 
of both demoi, diversity within states and in the transnational sphere, and the confrontation of 
possible points of view; inclusion as a prerequisite for ensuring non-domination and access to 
deliberation and participation in decision-making; and contestation as the way in which 
dominant discourses are challenged. I consider plurality as a transversal principle in the 
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institutional and discursive dimensions and link inclusion to the institutional level (as a 
prerequisite to initiate deliberation), and contestation to the discursive level (in order to avoid 
that the inclusion of voices results in discursive closure via political consensus). 
2. The establishment of the EIF 
The EIF was launched on the 20th and 21st of April 2009 together with the European Web Site 
on Integration. Its goals are primarily to improve the cooperation and exchange of information 
at the EU level in order to develop an EU agenda on integration and to increase the 
representation of voices from civil society. Originally, it was set up by the EC in 2005 and its 
actions carried out in cooperation with the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC). The EESC was also the entity responsible for a proposal (EESC 2008) establishing 
the structure of the EIF. The EIF plenary has a maximum of 100 members who meet twice a 
year. In order to include both representatives from the national level and the European level, 
onethird of the members are from European civil society networks (e.g., Caritas, Red Cross, 
trade unions, and human rights and antiracism organisations) and the remainder from 
consultative bodies in the Member States. There is no preference for a specific organisational 
structure, meaning that forums, platforms, councils and similar institutions are equally 
accepted. If no such organisation exists, the place is occupied by economic and social 
councils. Representatives of the National Contact Points on Integration, the EC, the EESC, 
the Committee of the Regions, experts (academics and researchers) and European local 
authority networks also take part in the plenary meetings. 
However, the major body of the EIF is the Bureau, composed by a president, appointed 
by the EESC in agreement with the EC, and three vice-presidents appointed by the EIF. These 
four members meet at least four times per year, before and after each plenary. The Bureau has 
a central role in assuring the continuity of the EIF, in setting its agenda and organising its 
work. Furthermore the EIF has a small secretariat of two persons from the EESC. 
2.1.  Methodological considerations 
Different sources were used to analyse the development of the EIF. Interviews with four 
members of the Bureau, which is responsible for defining and organising the agenda of the 
EIF in order to ensure its continuity, were carried out. The interviews were conducted 
between April 2010 and January 2011. I interviewed Luis Pariza, representative of the EESC, 
as well as the two representatives of civil society organisations: Lally Harpal, Council for 
Ethnic Minorities, representing civil society at the national level, and Peter Verhaeghe, 
Caritas, representing civil society at the European level. An EC official (who prefers to 
remain anonymous) with extensive knowledge about the EIF was also interviewed. The 
length of the interviews ranged from 40 to 60 minutes. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, 
English, or Danish depending on the language preferred by the interviewee. All interviews 
EIoP   © 2012 by Óscar García Agustín 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-010a.htm   8 
 
were semi-structured (Kvale 1997) and the interview guidelines shared some general points 
about the establishment, the content and the expectations of the EIF, and specific questions 
about the particular role and point of view of the representative in question. The objective of 
interviewing the Bureau members, and not other participants from the EIF plenary, is to 
examine the role of the main organism within the EIF, which assumes the definition and work 
of the EIF as it has been developed to date. The representative of the EC reflects the EU 
official point of view while the EESC represents the more institutionalised civil society vision 
within the EU, and Caritas and Council for Ethnic Minorities the national and international 
networks. Together, the latter three assume the representation of civil society within the EIF 
at the more executive level. 
I also used different kinds of documents as empirical material. These included EU 
policy documents on integration issued by the EC, the Council of the EU (hereafter referred to 
as the Council), and the EESC prior to and during the creation of the EIF. Documents 
generated by the EIF itself were included; these are mostly summary reports of discussions 
and contributions by the main EU actors, which reflect the evolution of the EIF. This analysis 
covers documents produced at the four EIF meetings held between 2009 and 2010 (Brussels, 
20–21 April 2009; 12–13 November 2009; 24–25 June 2010; 6–7 December 2010). 
2.2. Setting the context: possibilities and limitations 
I consider context to be the conditions that influence the development of the EIF, both 
institutionally and discursively. The context includes more than external, pre-determining 
actions, because discourses and institutions can also challenge and modify existing 
circumstances and even be seen as part of the context. Herein I focus on three kinds of 
context—legal framework, policies, and funding—that influence the development and 
decisions of the EIF. They are important factors that must be considered in order to 
understand the constraints, possibilities, and potential conflicts of the EIF. 
Within the legal framework, integration is strongly seen as a domestic issue, and nation-
states attempt to maintain their territorial sovereignty within this area (Sassen 1996). This 
fact, the disparity of national legislations and historic, cultural, and social differences explain 
the lack of binding policies and legislation at the EU level. Article 79.4 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which took effect in December 2009, changed this situation and created a legal framework 
that allows the EC to propose initiatives within the field of integration. For the first time, the 
EC is given leeway to work with integration at the EU level, but it is also quite limited 
regarding the subjects of integration and the relation between the EU member states: 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the 
action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country 
nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States. (Lisbon Treaty 79.4) 
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The most fundamental change is the greater role attributed to EU institutions: the right of 
initiative of the EC and the capacity of the European Parliament to legislate together with the 
Council. The content, on the other hand, does not really differ from the work undertaken by 
the EU in recent years. The article delimits the group at which the legislation is aimed, as it is 
defined as ‘third-country nationals residing legally’ in the EU member states. This narrows 
considerably the field of action in relation to integration. Furthermore, the explicit exclusion 
of harmonisation prevents any common legislation and underlines the national dimension 
attributed to integration. Thus, the EU methodology based on exchange of best practices, 
benchmarking, and cooperation is presented as the best way for working at the EU level. 
Despite the reduced legislative impact, the deliberative approach can be used to foster 
discussion, reasoning of policies, and inclusion of other points of views, just like the EIF does 
in its practices. 
The new agenda on EU common integration, which constitutes the policy context, was 
initiated by the Tampere Conclusions in 1999 and was later developed by the Hague 
Programme (adopted by the Council in 2004) to promote higher integration of national 
policies. To support this purpose, a European discourse on integration was articulated through 
the adoption of a set of Common Basic Principles (CBPs) by the Justice of Home Affairs 
Council (2004) and later put forward by the EC in ‘A Common Agenda for Integration’ 
(2005). The implementation of the CBPs is one of the main priorities of the EU, as reflected 
in the Stockholm Programme (2009) and the preparation of the Second Agenda for 
Integration, which is planned for the end of 2011. In summary, the EIF was established 
through previous policies, but it is also going to contribute to determining the future policy 
context within the already fixed framework. 
In terms of the funding context, the European Fund for the Integration of third-country 
nationals 2007–2013 was established by the Council in 2007 as part of the programme titled 
‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’. Its target is to facilitate integration of third-
country nationals by applying the CBPs. The budget for 2007 to 2013 is 825 million euros, 
divided into 768 million euros distributed among member states and 57 million euros for 
community actions. Funding is central to every deliberative organisation, especially if 
participation must be ensured. In this sense, the funding of the EIF ensures the meetings of the 
Bureau and the participation of diverse organisations, including immigrants’ organisations. 
Resources for EIF meetings are included in the annual work programme for community 
actions. 
All in all, the Lisbon Treaty constitutes a legal framework that enables the possibility to 
act at EU level within the field of integration and, at the same time, constraints discourses 
since integration is restricted to third country nationals residing legally in EU member states. 
Furthermore, the development of a common discourse diminishes the emergence of 
discourses challenging it. The institutionalisation of the EIF can contribute to strengthening 
cooperation and exchange of information between civil society and EU institutions but it is 
difficult to conceive of it as offering an alternative discourse.  
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2.3. A deliberative forum and the principle of plurality 
In the second meeting of the EIF, Jacques Barrot referred to the EIF as ‘a deliberative 
community to think integration policies together’ (EU 2009b: 1). According to the EC, the 
goal is ‘consultation, exchange of expertise and drawing up recommendations’ (EC 2005: 13). 
Due to the lack of harmonisation between EU member states’ integration policies, 
deliberation can be a very fruitful way to exchange information and discuss integration 
policies while ensuring broader participation (i.e., beyond policy makers and experts). 
Because harmonisation is not on the agenda, the EIF can instead ‘give an impulse to a 
common European focus on integration issues’ (Luis Pariza, interview April 2010). In other 
words, deliberation can ensure better representation and participation of plurality and promote 
an inclusionary European common agenda taking civil society into account. It is important to 
delimitate the existing tools to work with integration at the EU level and further explore the 
role of civil society and its embodiment of plurality. 
Before the creation of the EIF, a network of governmental experts (The National 
Contact Points on Integration) was responsible for the common EU agenda on integration and 
exchange of information and good practices within the field. The National Contact Points will 
continue to coordinate integration policies and cooperate with the EIF. However, in contrast 
to the National Contact Points, the EIF mainly consists of civil society organisations, not 
government representatives, and it transcends national cooperation by combining national and 
European organisations within the same forum. 
The three mechanisms already mentioned (the EIF, the EWSI, and the European Fund 
for Integration), together with the ‘Handbooks on Integration for Policy-makers and 
Practitioners’, aim to apply the CBPs to European policies at all levels (European, national, 
regional, local). The role of civil society, the combination of European and national 
organisations, and the deliberative nature of its work make the EIF a new and differentiated 
way of elaborating integration policies at the EU level. 
The deliberative proposal of the EIF should be effective in the sense that it should 
influence national and European policies. The civil society actors are optimistic about the 
possibility of gaining real influence, especially on the EC (being itself a part of the EIF), 
although they are also aware of the need to influence the Council if they really want to 
translate their claims into policies. Participation in collective decision making is, in itself, 
seen as very positive. For example, both Lally Harpal and Luis Pariza emphasize the fact that 
the two NGO representatives in the EIF, Harpal and Verhaeghe, participated as direct 
members rather than just as invitees in the European ministerial conference on integration that 
took place on 15–16 April 2010. The conclusions of the Council stress the idea that the EIF 
‘should continue to be involved in providing input for future initiatives in the field of 
integration at the EU level’ (Council of the EU 2010: 10). 
There is consensus among the members of the Bureau on the desirability of the EIF, as a 
structure, to improve integration policies and participation. There is no intention of producing 
legislation; instead the focus is on influencing policy making. Indeed, the benefit of the EIF 
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involves strengthening communication through deliberation: ‘Everybody who wants to 
contribute to it has the chance to contribute to it and there should be no… you know like a 
long membership processes or anything and rules and procedures because that slows down the 
communication… it could be a risk of slowing down communication between stakeholders’ 
(Peter Verhaeghe, interview November 2010). In other words, a change in the structure and 
goal of the EIF towards decision making, from governance to government, would go against 
its essence. Communication and deliberation must not be assessed only in terms of influence 
upon legislation but also by their capacity to create transnational networks and alternative 
discourses and practices. Below I discuss how deliberation requires an appropriate structure to 
promote inclusion and participation (i.e., the institutional dimension) and then how it might 
produce consensus and contestations about how to understand and work with integration (i.e., 
the discursive dimension). 
2.4. The institutional dimension and the principle of inclusion 
The institutional dimension of deliberation should ensure that all social actors affected by 
policy-making are included and able to take the initiative to deliberate, according to the idea 
of non-domination. Due to the complexity of the EIF, I look at inclusion at different levels: 
firstly, the combination of transnational and national actors and its relevance for the 
Europeanisation of integration policies and how it will benefit certain ways of organising civil 
society; secondly, the inclusion of immigrants and their participation in integration policies 
must be attended as well as who represents their interest and how they are financed; and 
finally, I want to focus on the relationship between EU institutions and civil society 
organisations and the way in which both try to benefit from participating in the EIF.  
While the EESC represents civil society in general and is highly integrated in the EU 
structure, and the EC has its own civil society interlocutors with whom they usually interact, 
there is a need to deal with integration at other levels, including the national one: 
Let’s say that the natural interlocutors of the Commission in this consultation culture are 
the organisational networks at the European level, this is very logical [...]. However, this 
was not considered to be sufficient, that besides the networks that, in our case it could be 
30 organisations, not more than that, that are active on a regular basis within the field of 
integration and are present here in Brussels and that have this territorial representation… 
apart from those, it would be interesting to get in contact with organisations strictly at the 
national level. (EC official, interview January 2011) 
It is interesting to see how European networks are defined as ‘natural interlocutors’. This 
reflects the way in which the EC acts at the EU level. The inclusion of national organisations 
acknowledges that integration is undertaken mostly at the national level. The combination of 
the European and the national levels, on the one hand, and the European institutions and 
European and national networks, on the other, makes the EIF a new kind of organisation that 
must develop new ways of interconnecting all levels if it wants to be effective. The EIF also 
can be viewed as a combination of formal or institutionalised sources of order (the EC and the 
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EESC) and informal ones (European and national organisations), and this stance underscores 
the importance of incorporating different discourses in settings that are not strongly 
institutionalised. The following was recorded at the first meeting of the EIF: ‘As no dialogue 
platform on integration had previously been set up on a European scale there was no ready-
made formula on how the EIF should work and it was for the participants to shape it actively’ 
(EIF 2009a). 
The coordination between European and national networks is not an easy task. As 
‘natural interlocutors’, the European networks are well established, in contact with EU 
institutions, and engaged in European policies. In contrast, the national networks are not 
necessarily interrelated, and they are more oriented towards domestic issues. This makes it 
difficult for them to work beyond national borders. The representative of the national NGOs 
highlights this problem: 
And it is also [the international organisations] that Europe is most interested in as such 
like when we think for instance about the European Commission, they are also the ones 
saying ‘okay, we have to take the ones that include the whole picture of Europe’. […] 
And for instance I experience a huge challenge as a member of the Bureau representing 
the national organizations that when they then return to their countries, then they just 
take care of themselves, then they don’t think so much about ‘well, we have a network 
in Germany or in Austria’ or something like that, then they just focus on this. The 
greatest challenge in relation to this concerns the coordination of the national 
organizations actually. (Lally Harpal, interview October 2010) 
This quote points out both the asymmetric relationship between international and national 
organisations and the preferences of the European institutions. Albeit the inclusion of national 
organisations in the deliberative process would represent the interests of the new European 
plurality better, it remains unclear whether the EIF will contribute to overcoming this 
distinction and increase the Europeanisation of national organisations and their participation 
in European policies.The inclusion of national NGOs represents a way of combating the 
deliberative deficit and trying to give voice to organisations that usually do not participate in 
the decision-making process. Therefore, national members must be selected carefully. 
However, the EIF’s selection criteria are vague. There is clearly a preference for integrating 
other deliberative forums acting at the national level, but the problem is that these types of 
forums (or similar structures) exist in only a few countries (only six have been recognised as 
such by the EC). For the remaining countries, the National Contact Points on Integration 
choose the national representatives. 
Nevertheless, the EIF is committed to promoting the creation of national forums which 
could be a good opportunity for civil society organisations to be taken into account and gain 
influence at EU level. This is an example of how an emerging transnational organisation 
would be able to influence national organising positively. If successful, civil society 
organisations could gain a higher degree of autonomy and choose their own representatives 
instead of depending on the ministries in the majority of the cases, as is the situation now. The 
deliberative structure also would increase and promote representation of the diversity of social 
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groups. Some organisations might assume the format of the forum at the national level as a 
strategic measure to elect members from their own countries and gain influence with the EC. 
The deliberative ideal of promoting participation of those who are affected by integration 
policies should be reflected better in the structure of the EIF. 
In this sense, participation is effective if immigrant organisations are also included. The 
addition of the national level should support this. For this reason, I emphasize the need to 
expand the structure of forums to the national arena. This concern is expressed in several 
documents and in the interviews, and it is one of the major potential achievements of the EIF. 
There is a risk of increasing the exclusion of immigrants at the European level, reducing the 
possibility of their participation, and the EIF is aware of this and intends to ‘overcome the 
lack of involvement in the European debate of immigrant organisations and organisations 
representing immigrants’ interests’ (EIF 2009a: 2). Combining the European and national 
networks can institutionalise deliberation across borders and ensure the public dialogue 
necessary to apply the non-domination principle. However, it requires a supportive funding 
policy in order to avoid the perpetuation of unequal representation. In the Second EU Agenda 
for Integration, the EIF (2010) suggested increasing the proportion of EU funding given to 
smaller organisations, especially migrant organisations in order to avoid their discrimination.  
Despite the agreement on the inclusion of immigrant organisations, the EC diminishes 
the relevance of talking about organisations with an immigrant membership base exclusively: 
‘There is no obvious difference between immigrants and European nationals when it comes to 
selection. So if the organisations work with integration and they are representative, then 
normally they will have immigrants within the organisations and they will send them as well 
as participants in the Forum’ (EC official, interview January 2011). This perspective opens up 
a relevant discussion about whether to include immigrant organisations specifically or instead 
to assume that organisations themselves are capable of integrating both nationals and 
immigrants. From a deliberative approach, the first point of view should be embraced, as the 
non-representation of particular interests could marginalise legitimate interests (Phillips 
2000), and the participation of those affected by the policies consequently would not be 
ensured. 
Because of the EC’s leading role, the EIF cannot be considered a proper civil society 
actor or initiative. This makes it relevant to ask about the role of the EC and the degree to 
which civil society is used mainly to provide legitimacy to the EU in a field such as 
integration in which advances so far have been quite weak. Indeed, the mixed model 
(institutionalised EU organisations and non-institutionalised networks) is beneficial for both 
sides, and not only for the EC. The EIF can potentially create a win-win situation, although 
the reasons differ. NGOs enjoy considerable popularity and legitimacy (Castells 2008) and 
have experience working with everyday integration; by including them the EU policies can 
achieve greater acceptance. Furthermore, NGOs have access to more resources through EU 
financing and can potentially influence policies to a higher degree (Rolandsen Agustín 2011). 
The EIF views access to the EC by civil society interlocutors as very positive: 
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The importance of the Forum lies in the fact that civil society organisations are not 
confined to meeting and talking amongst themselves – they have the opportunity to make 
their views, demands and expectations known to the EU institutions responsible for 
drafting and deciding on EU initiatives and policies at the highest level. (Sepi 2009: 1) 
The possibility of having real influence on EU policies is higher with the EIF because it 
integrates civil society and the EC but also develops a new kind of accountability beyond the 
national borders (i.e., discussing the proposals of the EC, sharing experiences, and promoting 
alternative points of view to be debated). The intention of increasing not only participation 
but also allowing European and national organisations to take the initiative could be seen as a 
more bottom-up form of deliberating and decision making: 
In EESC we have actually also encouraged giving more time for NGOs to pronounce 
themselves on this and bring their things forward. Asking them to participate and 
contribute with saying what they think is more important to them instead of us coming 
with… the ones in the Bureau, we can only give them a framework on what is possible. 
(Lally Harpal, interview October 2010) 
However, the framework is still set by the EC following EU development in the field, and it is 
difficult to imagine a bottom-up process that is not counteracted by the EU agenda and the 
existing discourse on European integration, articulated in the policy context. Nevertheless, the 
intention of the EIF is to increase participation, accountability, and influence in policy making 
rather than promoting an alternative (bottom-up) process or discourse. 
In summary, the institutional design of the EIF presents ambivalent results in its first 
steps to implement transnational deliberation applying the principle of inclusion. Despite the 
multilevel governance structures, there is still a risk of privileging dialogue between EU 
institutions and networks and keeping integration as a domestic issue for national 
organisations. The expansion of the forum as deliberative structure to the national arenas is a 
positive influence, but it is doubtful that the representation of immigrants is going to be 
promoted. For this reason, it is important to emphasise that the EIF will have to show its 
influence in setting up the EU integration agenda and increase inclusiveness (of national and 
EU organisations, civil society and immigrants) in order to be considered an effective 
mechanism for strengthening democracy and not a symbolic source of legitimacy for the EU. 
2.5. The discursive dimension and the principle of contestation 
The third principle of deliberation is contestation, understood as the capacity to produce 
contesting discourses that challenge the hegemonic discourse and, through reflection, change 
the minds of the participants and everybody affected by a decision. As argued above, the EIF 
presents a deliberative structure that is open to inclusion, participation, and influence. The 
inclusion of different actors is necessary to represent plurality, but this does not mean that 
plural interests are going to be represented or influential. Since the EIF is a mixed structure, it 
is convenient to look at the discourses of the EC, as the main EU actor, and those of the civil 
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society, both the more institutionalised voice of the EESC and the international and national 
networks that comprise the Bureau. 
The participation of the EC should be assessed to determine if the EIF strengthens the 
official EU discourse or offers other alternatives. Despite its lack of strong policies, a 
normative system, and a harmonised policy on integration, a European discourse on 
integration is in fact articulated by the policy context. Regarding the timing of the 
establishment of the EIF in 2005, a key EIF document notes that ‘the EU is […] at a turning 
point and the Forum comes to life at a very topical moment’ (EIF 2009a: 2). Thus, the EIF 
contributes actively to an emerging discourse and the context within which integration 
discourse must be developed. This leads to questioning the limits to elaborating a contesting 
discourse and, more clearly, the risk of discursive homogenisation and its adaptation to the 
hegemonic discourse. 
The EIF shares national experiences and tries to adopt a common European approach. A 
common discourse is developed and some of its weaker aspects are made visible in order to 
remedy them. Moreover, whenever possible the EIF tries to propose alternative interpretations 
of the current integration model. However, the discussion of the policies and the discursive 
contribution of the EIF are constrained by the context of the legal framework, policies, and 
funding, and this makes change difficult. Rather than an alternative discourse, what is 
expected is an improvement of the approach within the established framework. This 
influences the discussion about the main concepts that determine polices, and it diminishes 
the capacity of the EIF to create discourses of resistance: 
If you have, for example, in the Forum, the discussion about how do we make progress 
in [integration policies], then you always have people who want to come back to the 
basics, meaning ‘yes, let’s have first a decision on a definition of integration’ and then 
you can so ‘yes, okay, a definition on integration, we have the Common Basic 
Principles which are agreed in principle by the 27 member states, so let’s use them as a 
basis and let’s not have another 48 hour discussion about what exactly is integration’. 
(Peter Verhaeghe, interview November 2010) 
Deliberation does not mean that all participants agree completely; rather, it refers to the 
achievement of a consensus, with acceptance by the majority of those who have had the 
opportunity to present their arguments. In this sense, it would not be necessary to discuss the 
idea of integration constantly. Nonetheless, the EC and the Council are the actors that fix the 
terms of discussion a priori, at least in relation to this semantic issue. The reflexive 
discussions of the meanings of integration could illustrate how a discourse of integration is 
constructed and what consequences it has in the formulation of policies. 
The main discursive constraint that seriously affects the model of integration has to do 
with third-country nationals as the target group of integration. The objective of the EIF is to 
make propositions and exchange experiences and best practices of integration exclusively of 
third-country nationals. Few NGOs would agree on this point. The interviews and the 
discussions of the EIF emphasize that integration cannot be thought of only in relation to this 
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group, and such a categorisation does not reflect the way in which polices on integration 
should work. Although the Lisbon Treaty may be a step forward in European legislation of 
integration, it prevents the application of integration policies to other target groups. The 
European Fund for Integration promotes this limitation because all financed projects must be 
aimed at third-country nationals. NGOs claim that they use a more ‘comprehensive approach 
to integration’ (EIF 2009b: 4). 
‘Third-country national’ is actually an EU category that originates from a division 
between EU members or non-EU members regardless of their nationality. However, it is 
artificial and quite difficult to apply to integration policies at the local or national levels 
because such policies are aimed not only at third-country nationals but more generally at 
immigrants or citizens. Furthermore, this division conveys the idea that integration is mostly a 
one-way process of third-country nationals integrating into host societies. The EU reluctance 
to recognise the existence of irregular immigrants is remarkable. The latter are not considered 
a subject of integration because the EU has stressed that irregular immigrants belong to the 
area of security and are subject to migration control and not integration initiatives. The civil 
society discourse of contestation is mitigated due to the acceptance of this framework for 
integration: ‘The chairman and other speakers wished, however, to point out that the work of 
the EIF, in line with its legal base, would be to focus specifically on the situation of third-
country nationals residing legally in EU Member States’ (EESC 2008: 10). Thus, there is a 
discursive closure that narrows the impact of the contestation and homogenizes the discourse. 
To avoid the limitations of the context, the EIF attributes more relevance to the available 
resources that could be used to increase integration and redefine it beyond the concept of 
integration as it relates to the labour market. There is an interest in increasing the coherence 
between immigration and integration policies, in contrast to the recent tendencies to deal with 
them separately. More challenging is the proposal of mainstreaming integration policies (an 
idea that is shared by the EIF and the EC). The EIF focus on mainstreaming must be 
understood in relation to the common European discourse on integration. Some of the 
common values (especially integration as a two-way process) are stressed, and their lack of 
application (the excessive focus on immigrants and the lack of focus on the role of the 
receiving society) is censured. The EIF focuses its efforts directly at overcoming the financial 
constraints and shows how discourse can change the context and consequently be developed 
without such constraints: 
And we propose to strengthen the two-way dimension of the policies and not letting the 
European Fund for Integration finance national policies which do not take into account 
this dual direction. And we think that integration in the future should be related better 
to equal treatment and the fight against discrimination and citizens’ access, people’s 
political rights (Luis Pariza, interview April 2010). 
This is a concrete example of how European policies can influence national policies (i.e., by 
prioritising the two-way process). The discourse of integration as a two-way process becomes 
stronger and counteracts the discourse based on the duties of immigrants. The need to attach 
immigration to other issues, such as equal treatment, the fight against discrimination, and 
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access, reflects the importance of assuming mainstreaming as a strategy to deal with 
integration. This point of view is described in depth by the representative of the European 
organisations: 
If you really go into the issue then, and you say that integration is a two-way process, 
then you can’t do anything else but… well, what is called mainstreaming. What you 
can also call… have a general policy which covers the whole population but with 
specific attention for groups that need this specific support or specific attention in the 
process of social inclusion or under the social exclusion of people in general. And that 
should not be focused specifically on migrants because they are migrants but there are 
specific groups of migrants who face social exclusion because of specific reasons and 
then this has to be addressed, of course, but it should be part of an overall strategy for 
promoting the social inclusion and the cohesion in our societies. (Peter Verhaeghe, 
interview November 2010) 
Both representatives of civil society in the Bureau agree on the relevance of the two-way 
process as a core value in integration policies and on mainstreaming as a strategy to put it into 
practice. In contrast to the narrow definition of immigrants put forward in the Lisbon Treaty, 
the mainstreaming strategy questions the categorisation in itself. Immigrants should not be the 
target group as a general and homogenous group, but rather only in cases in which they suffer 
from social exclusion (just like any other specific group under similar circumstances). 
This strategy is an attempt to challenge the narrow framework that actually is imposed 
on the EIF and to undo the strong presence of the category ‘third-country national’ (and its 
implications for the formulation of integration policies). Combining two-way process and 
mainstreaming, a broader framework is suggested: 
And then even in the further future I think the European Integration Forum should… or 
become a Forum not only dealing with integration of migrants but with social inclusion 
of …and social cohesion in our societies or develop closer links and cooperation with 
other platforms dealing with that. One of the things I’m looking after… because if we 
say integration, we also say antidiscrimination. (Peter Verhaeghe, interview November 
2010) 
Thinking of integration as social inclusion, equal treatment, and antidiscrimination has several 
advantages. Among other things, it blurs the impact of the third-country national category in 
policy making and requires a more general category to be shared by immigrants and nationals, 
which divests immigration of negative connotations. The scope of contestation is obviously 
limited, and the discourse is mainly strategic but aimed to modify some of the aspects of the 
current hegemonic discourse on integration. 
Civil society does promote contesting discourses but, as I have shown, contestation is 
limited because of the process of institutionalisation of the EIF. However, contestation could 
still be effective if the EIF discourse is not limited to the margins of the institutionalised 
discourse but instead speaks to the public sphere and aims to influence public opinion in 
competition with other discourses on integration. Transnational civil society still faces 
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discourses that promote racism and xenophobia at all levels. Thus, counterdiscourses that 
promote other ways of handling integration are needed: 
Trying to counterbalance these political discourses so that the agenda in terms of 
integration and the agenda in terms of immigration are not only determined by fear, by 
xenophobia, but also influenced by the relation to equality, to rights, to social policies. 
We know that our battle has fewer resources, in this conflict we have fewer weapons 
than our counterpart, but at least we try to balance the official discourse so that it does 
not slide too much towards the exclusionary aspects. (Luis Pariza, interview April 
2010) 
Taking for granted that institutionalisation leads to a loss of power of contestation, the 
effectiveness of the discourse of civil society lies in its ability to influence the official 
discourse and counteract the impact of other exclusionary discourses, which usually are 
reproduced by mass media. The common European discourse on integration can be viewed as 
a counterdiscourse that opposes xenophobic discourses or counteracts some assimilationist 
dimensions of national integration models by focusing on integration as a two-way process. 
However, we must not overlook the fact that the discourse reproduces to a certain degree the 
integration discourse of the EC, and the EC is likewise conditioned by article 79.4 of the 
Lisbon Treaty regarding the target group of integration. 
In summary, discursive constraints are placed on the articulation of alternatives because 
policy changes can only be conceived within the already established framework, which is 
characterised by the exclusive focus on third-country nationals as the target group of EU 
integration policies. An examination of the change in discourse experienced by civil society 
actors participating in the EIF confirms Dryzek’s scepticism about government and the 
reproduction of hegemonic discourses. Nevertheless, the relevant organisations are aware of 
these constraints and do not renounce the idea of gaining more influence (through cooperation 
with the EC). Therefore, civil society discourses lose their capacity for contestation, and 
contestation is instead replaced by more strategic formulations, such as mainstreaming, which 
are aimed at changing policies within the existing framework. 
Conclusion 
The emergence of a transnational sphere makes it possible to reconsider policies and include 
new ideas and procedures such as deliberation, governance, and social networks. Criticism of 
the democratic deficit of the EU is often justified and well argued, as it highlights the lack of 
representation of citizens at the European level. Deliberative democracy offers new 
possibilities for strengthening democracy at the transnational level, especially regarding 
participation and inclusion in search of the common good. More analyses are needed to 
investigate how deliberation is applied in concrete organisations and settings in order to 
assess its contribution to democracy. 
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I have analysed a new consultative organisation, the EIF, which reflects a new 
multilevel way of approaching integration of immigrants by including (national and 
European) civil society and EU institutions in a common forum. I have applied deliberative 
democracy as an analytical framework, distinguishing between the institutional and the 
discursive dimensions, based on three normative principles: plurality, inclusion and 
contestation. The process of institutionalisation occurs through the interaction between 
discourse and institution, whereas the normative principles applied here make it possible to 
assess the degree and quality of deliberation. I find this model useful in terms of the further 
development of deliberative democracy as a working theory. 
I argue that the institutional design is exceptional and reflects the multilevel governance 
structure characterising the EU by including in its set-up both European- and national-level 
organisations, on the one hand, and civil society actors and EU institutions, on the other. This 
institutional design reflects a real effort to create a deliberative forum that combines the 
European and national levels and includes organisations that normally do not have the ability 
to influence policy making. The application of the principle of inclusion reveals that it 
remains unclear how plurality is going to be part of deliberation and policy-making. The 
combination of multiple levels (EU institutions and civil society networks at both national and 
European levels) is new and challenging, but unresolved in terms of how the cooperation 
between European and national organisations is going to work out. A similar situation is 
found regarding the inclusion of immigrant organisations, which would allow those affected 
by policy decisions to participate in the policy process. These doubts must be cleared up if the 
EIF wants to be perceived as an effective instrument to increase civil society participation and 
not just a way of obtaining legitimacy for the EU, especially the EC’s approach to integration. 
Regarding the discursive dimension, based on the normative principle of contestation, I 
argue that policy changes are only conceived within the already established framework. 
Moreover, the delimitation of integration policies in terms of third-country nationals as the 
only target groups is significant for the constraints placed on the articulation of alternative 
discourses. In other words, the discursive dimension tones down some of the advantages of 
deliberative democracy and the ability of civil society to change policies, at least in terms of 
the frameworks for enhancing policy making. Constrained by the Lisbon Treaty, previous 
policies, and funding of integration, the EC establishes the framework and the dominant 
discourse on integration. This fact then determines the scope of contesting discourses. The 
EIF assumes the need for developing the existing common European discourse on integration 
further even though the degree of contestation is quite low, and, strictly speaking, no 
alternative discourse is developed. However, civil society attempts to change some aspects of 
the dominant discourse by focusing on integration as a two-way process, on the one hand, and 
on mainstreaming, on the other. Furthermore the civil society organisations use the possibility 
of gaining influence on policy making in tight cooperation with the EC. 
Transnational action translates not only into Europeanisation of policies and deliberative 
governance beyond the nation-state (Eriksen 2005), it also translates into the development of 
national and European spheres that mutually influence each other. Although a conflict exists 
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between the scope of the discourses in terms of promoting change and their lower profile once 
they become institutionalised, the EIF underpins some of the possibilities and limitations of 
applying a deliberative approach that combines the role of transnational civil society and the 
need for a new European (and national) institutional design. However, to make progress in the 
direction of more participatory and inclusive polices, the EIF should try to take advantage of 
some of the possibilities and overcome some of the limitations. For instance, the structure of 
the Forum should be strongly promoted also at the national level in order to include more civil 
society organisations; the Bureau, just like the other organisations, should define its functions 
and expectations in the field of integration more clearly; the inclusion of immigrants should 
be prioritised both in terms of particular and general organisations; and it should be made 
possible to discuss integration without the constraints of the Lisbon Treaty (not tackling a 
number of relevant situations, such as irregular immigration, immigrants within the EU, as 
well as the so-called second and third generations) by introducing a new, enabling framework 
(like social exclusion). 
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